Issues in the Analysis of Capital Formation and Productivity Growth by Peter K. Clark
PETER  K.  CLARK 
Stanford University 
Issues  in the  Analysis 
of Capital  Formation 
and  Productivity  Growth 
FOR  NEARLY  TWO  DECADES  between  World  War  II and the mid-1960s, 
real output  per hour of labor  input  in the private  sector  of the U.S. econ- 
omy grew at an average  rate of nearly  3 percent  a year. Since then, this 
measure  of labor productivity  has decelerated  noticeably,  first to about 
2 percent  a year between 1965 and 1973, and then to 1 percent  or less 
a year between 1973 and 1978. This slowdown  is an important  macro- 
economic  phenomenon  that has sparked  interest  in the academic  com- 
munity,  the government,  and  the business  press. 
Although  there  can  be no doubt  that  growth  of labor  productivity,  how- 
ever defined,  has slowed dramatically  in the past ten or fifteen  years,  the 
particular  data used to measure  the growth  of input and output have a 
substantial  effect on the estimated  magnitude  of the slowdown,  and an 
even more important  influence  on estimates  of what caused it. In this 
paper  I present  different  measures  of real output,  labor  input,  and  capital 
input for the private  nonfarm  nonresidential  business  sector of the U.S. 
economy,  and compare  the results  obtained  by choosing  various  sets of 
series  to analyze  recent  productivity  trends. 
Measures of Real Output 
Disagreement  about the appropriate  measure  of output has been an 
issue in the analysis  of productivity  trends  ever since the sharp  exchange 
Note:  This research was supported in part by a national fellowship from the 
Hoover Institution  on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford  University. 
0007-2303/79/0002-0423$00.25/O0 (  Brookintgs  Inistitution 424  Brookings Papers on Econzomic Activity, 2:1979 
of views between  Edward  F. Denison and Dale W. Jorgenson  and Zvi 
Griliches.1  Jorgenson  and Griliches  maintain  that output  should  be mea- 
sured  by gross  product;  Denison  advocates  net  product,  with a subtraction 
for depreciation  of the capital  stock.  Jorgenson  and  Griliches  prefer  to ag- 
gregate  all goods and services  delivered  to final demand,  while Denison 
points  out that  this gross  aggregate  is unavailable  for sustained  consump- 
tion  because  part  of the capital  stock  is used up in its production. 
An additional  question  raised  in this debate  is which set of prices to 
use  in the  aggregation  of output.  At various  times,  Jorgenson  and  Griliches 
have used market  prices (with excise taxes on output included) and 
producer  prices (with excise taxes on output  excluded).2 Denison evalu- 
ates output at factor cost, subtracting  indirect  business taxes on both 
output  and  input  from  gross  product.3  Here again,  the choice is equivocal 
-producer prices  evaluate  inputs  from the point of view of the users of 
inputs;  factor  cost,  from  the  point  of view  of their  suppliers. 
The first  four rows in table 1 compare  rates of growth  of output  for 
the nonfarm  nonresidential  business  sector, calculated  in different  ways, 
with  a view  toward  isolating  the effects  of different  measurement  methods. 
The subtraction  of straight-line  depreciation  (second row) or "one-hoss 
shay" retirements  (fourth row) makes only a small difference  in the 
calculated  growth  rate  of output;  the largest  difference  is the 0.24 percent- 
age point a year between  the GNP and NNP concepts  during  the 1965- 
73 period. Differences  in the other two time-periods  are considerably 
smaller.  Growth  rates calculated  using net output measures  indicate a 
slight  slowdown  in the 1965-73 period;  as a consequence,  the labor  pro- 
ductivity  slowdown  in 1973-78 relative  to 1965-73 is generally  smaller 
with  net output  than  with gross  output.  Differences  between  growth  rates 
of output  aggregated  using  market  prices  and  factor  cost are  minuscule. 
1. For a compilation of the various articles written on both sides of this debate, 
see "The Measurement  of Productivity,"  Sulrvey  of Cuirrent  Business, vol. 52 (May 
1972, pt. 2), pp. 3-1 1  1. 
2.  For market  prices, see D. W. Jorgenson  and Z. Griliches, "The Explanation  of 
Productivity  Change,"  Review of Economic Studies,  vol. 34 (July 1967), pp. 249-83. 
For producer prices, see Dale W. Jorgenson and Zvi Griliches, "Issues in Growth 
Accounting: A Reply to Edward F. Denison," Survey of Current  Business, vol. 52 
(May 1972), pt. 2, pp. 65-94. 
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Table 1. Rates of Growth  of Output  and  Input,  Nonfarm  Nonresidential  Business 
Sector, Selected Periods,  1948-78 
Annual average,  in percent 
Measure  1948-65  1965-73  1973-78 
Outplut 
Gross output evaluated  at 1972  market  prices 
(GNP concept)  3.74  3.82  2.47 
Net output evaluated  at 1972 market  prices 
(NNP concept)  3.70  3.58  2.36 
Net output evaluated  at 1972  factor cost 
(NI concept)  3.75  3.60  2.31 
Net output evaluated  at 1972  market  prices 
(consistent  with "one-hoss  shay" 
depreciation)a  3.78  3.74  2.37 
Labor  input 
Hours worked  0.96  1.69  1.53 
Full-time  equiivalent  employment  0.90  2.55  1.79 
Full-time and part-time  employment  1.21  2.44  2.10 
Capital  input 
Gross capital stock ("one-hoss  shay" 
depreciation)a  3.40  4.52  3.24 
Net capital stock (straight-line  depreciation)  3.92  4.81  2.87 
Gross capital services  (adjusted  for shift 
from structures  to equipment)  3.53  4.60  3.37 
Sources: The measures of  output are from the U.S.  Bureau of  Economic Analysis, national income 
and product accounts. Labor inputs (hours, full-time and part-time employment, and full-time equiva- 
lent employment) are calculated from Bureau of Ecolnomic  Analysis and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
data  in a manner  similar  to that  used  in Edward  F.  Denison,  Accounti jg  for  Unzited  States  Economic  Growth, 
1929-1969  (Brookings Institution, 1974). Hours worked data are from  the  Bureau of  Labor Statisics. 
The series for net and gross capital stock are from the Bureau of  Economic Analysis and are described 
in John C. Musgrave, "Fixed Nonresidential Business and Residential Capital in the United States, 1929- 
75," Survey  of Curri  enzt  Business,  vol. 56 (April 1976), pp. 46-52. For the procedure used to adjust the capital 
services series, see the discussion in the text. Figures are rounded. 
a.  This assumes that an investment is carried at its full value in the capital stock until the end of its 
useful lifetime. 
Measures  of Labor  Input 
The calculation  of labor  input  is complicated  by a serious  aggregation 
problem;  labor "quality"  varies  from worker  to worker.  To account  for 
changes  in the average  "quality"  of an hour worked,  analysts  of growth 
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force.4 There is general agreement  that adjustments  for age and sex 
can explain  a small part (a quarter  or less) of the decline in growth  of 
output  per hour  of labor  input  between  1965 and 1973. In the 1973-78 
period,  the shift  toward  lower-paid  age and sex categories  slowed a little, 
implying  that shifts in the age-sex composition  of the work force since 
1973 have been a slight help in preventing  an even larger  reduction  in 
productivity  growth. 
A different  issue concerning  labor input is important  in determining 
the  effect  of capital  intensity  on the  growth  of labor  productivity.  Although 
"hours"  or "quality-adjusted  hours" is the standard  measure  of labor 
input, a case can be made for adjusting  hours to a full-time  equivalent 
basis to account  for reduction  in the workweek  of capital.  For example, 
suppose that in 1965 an office building and its associated equipment 
(worth  $1 million  at 1972 prices) combined  with twenty  workers  on the 
job forty hours a week to produce output worth $600,000  (at  1972 
prices). The capital-labor  ratio, as conventionally  defined, would be 
$1,250 per labor-hour  each week. Later,  in 1973, assume  that the office 
building  still holds twenty full-time workers,  but that they work only 
tbirty-five  hours  each week. If the value of the building  and  equipment  is 
unchanged,  and output falls to $525,000  (1972 prices), conventional 
measures  would  indicate  that labor  productivity  remained  constant  while 
the capital-labor  ratio rose 14 percent.  However, at any time the office 
was open in 1973, an observer  would find that the ratio of capital to 
workers  was exactly the same as it was in 1965. Output  per full-time 
worker  and capital  stock per full-time  worker  remain  unchanged. 
The reverse situation  would occur if there were a systematic  move 
toward  more  intensive  utilization  of capital.  For example,  the trend  toward 
longer business  hours for retail establishments  could have lowered the 
ratio  of capital  to hours  worked  without  decreasing  actual  capital  intensity 
of production.  The problem  in both cases  is that  measured  changes  in the 
capital-labor  ratio  may  have  been generated  either  by shifts  in the amount 
of capital  available  to each worker  while he is on the job, or by changes 
in the average  workday  of capital.  Although  increases  in capital  available 
4.  For example, see Edward  F. Denison, "Explanations  of Declining Productivity 
Growth,"  Survey of Current  Bulsiness, vol. 59 (August 1979), pt. 2, pp. 1-24; Peter 
K. Clark, "Capital  Formation and the Recent Productivity Slowdown," Journal of 
Finance, vol. 33 (June 1978), pp. 965-75; the article by J. R. Norsworthy, Michael J. 
Harper,  and Kent Kunze in this issue; and earlier work by Denison, Jorgenson, and 
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Table  2. Rates  of Growth  of Alternative  Measures  of the Capital-Labor  Ratio, 
Nonfarm  Nonresidential  Business  Sector,  Selected  Periods,  1948-78 
Annual  average,  in percent 
Ratio  1948-65  1965-73  1973-78 
Net capital  stock to hours  worked  2.93  3.07  1.32 
Net capital  stock to full-time  equivalent 
employment  2.99  2.20  1.07 
Gross capital  services  to hours  worked  2.55  2.86  1.81 
Gross capital  services  to full-time 
equivalent  employment  2.60  2.00  1.56 
Sources: Same as table 1. Figures are rounded. 
to each  worker  while he is on the job should  increase  labor  productivity, 
the effect  of decreases  in the workweek  of capital  is less clear. 
The distinction  between  hours  and  employees  is particularly  important 
in the 1965-73 period, as shown in table 1. Before 1965, most of the 
difference  between  growth  in hours and growth  in employment  can be 
attributed  to increases  in the proportion  of part-time  workers.  But during 
the 1965-73 period,  reductions  in the full-time  workweek  more than ac- 
counted  for the substantial  difference  between  the  rates  of growth  of hours 
and  employment.  This sharp  1965-73 reduction  in the average  workweek 
raises  the possibility  that the capital  intensity  of production  continued  to 
fall between  1965 and 1973, as shown  in table 2. 
When  the capital-labor  ratio  is the net stock  of capital  divided  by hours 
worked,  its rate  of growth  increases  from  2.93 percent  a year  in 1948-65 
to 3.07 percent  a year  in 1965-73, and  then  falls off precipitously  to 1.32 
percent  a year  in 1973-78 just as Norsworthy,  Harper,  and  Kunze  point 
out. However,  if the sharp  drop  in the 1965-73 period  in the number  of 
hours  for full-time  workers  generated  a spurious  increase  in the capital- 
labor  ratio,  and the ratio  of capital  stock to full-time  equivalent  employ- 
ment  is a better  measure  of capital  intensity,  then a less confusing  pattern 
emerges.  Net capital stock per full-time equivalent  employee grows at 
2.99 percent  a year  in the 1948-65 period,  2.20 percent  in 1965-73, and 
1.07 percent  in 1973-78. In terms  of gross capital  services  and  full-time 
equivalent  employment,  the deceleration  in the growth  of capital  intensity 
is smaller,  but still divided  evenly  between 1965-73 and 1973-78. This 
pattern  of slowing  growth  of capital  intensity  in both periods  is more  con- 
sistent  with  the  observed  behavior  of labor  productivity. 428  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1979 
Measures  of Capital  Input 
When  the analysis  of productivity  is expanded  to include  the services  of 
capital  as an  input,  it is typically  assumed  that  capital  input  is proportional 
to some aggregate  measure  of the capital  stock. The U.S. Bureau  of Eco- 
nomic  Analysis  publishes  two such measures:  a gross stock, in which  an 
investment  is carried  at its full value in the capital  stock until the end of 
its useful lifetime ("one-hoss shay" depreciation), and a net stock, in 
which  an investment  is reduced  by a constant  amount  in the capital  stock 
each year (straight-line  depreciation). For the purposes of analyzing 
productivity  growth,  a series  that approximates  the "physical"  amount  of 
capital  services  used in the production  process  is of interest,  so the choice 
of a depreciation  schedule  is essentially  an empirical  question.  If capital 
retains  its efficiency  over its estimated  lifetime,  the gross stock is appro- 
priate.  If capital  loses efficiency  linearly,  so that  it is only half as efficient 
at the midpoint  of its life, then the net measure  is correct.  Casual  empiri- 
cism seems to indicate  that "one-hoss  shay"  depreciation  is closer  to the 
truth,  and  therefore  the  gross  measure  is more  appropriate  for productivity 
analysis. 
Such a simple  notion of a physical amount  of capital  input ignores  a 
number  of problems,  including  two that are discussed  below: the dura- 
bility  of capital  goods and  the embodiment  of technical  progress  in newer 
capital equipment.  The aggregation  of the capital stock is in terms of 
value; the dollar cost of an asset is deflated  to a common base (1972 
prices) and then added  to the capital  stock. If it is possible  to buy more 
durable  capital  equipment  at a higher  cost, changes  in the average  dura- 
bility can cause a constant  value aggregate  to misstate  the growth  of the 
physical  amount  of capital  input. 
For example,  consider  a world in which there are only two kinds of 
capital  goods: wooden hoes and aluminum  hoes. These hoes are totally 
interchangeable  in production,  but the wooden  hoes last  for only one year, 
and the aluminum  ones last for five years and cost three  times as much. 
As long as the average  ratio of wooden hoes to aluminum  hoes in the 
economy  remains  constant,  a value aggregate  for the capital stock will 
track  the growth  of physical capital  input (number  of hoes) correctly. 
But if, for some reason,  the ratio  of wooden  to aluminum  hoes increases, 
a value aggregate  understates  the growth  in physical  capital  input. Peter  K. Clark  429 
The shift in the composition  of the U.S. capital  stock from structures 
to equipment  over the past  thirty  years  entails  just  this  sort  of reduction  in 
durability.  A rough  adjustment  for the rise in capital  services  attributable 
to this shift may be calculated  by first assuming  that equipment  and 
structures  have physical  lifetimes  of fifteen  and forty years, respectively. 
If it is assumed  that the ratio  of capital  services  to capital  stock remains 
constant  for equipment,  structures,  and inventories,  the growth  rates of 
each component  may be aggregated  with constant  weights  to obtain the 
growth  rate  of gross  capital  services  shown  in the last row of table 1.5 The 
shift  from  structures  to equipment  has apparently  been smooth  enough  so 
that the rates of growth  of capital  input  with this adjustment  are similar 
to the other measures  in the table. The growth  rate of the gross capital 
stock  increased  1.12 percentage  points  a year  faster  in the 1965-73 period 
than  it did in the 1948-65 period;  the speedup  for gross  capital  services  is 
1.07 percentage  points. The two estimates  for the slowdown  in capital 
input growth  after 1973 are also close: 1.28 percentage  points for the 
gross capital stock and 1.23 points for gross capital services.  The shift 
from structures  to equipment  has not been an additional  factor in the 
slowdown  of labor  productivity  in either  1965-73 or 1973-78. 
Another  complication  enters  when one allows  for the possibility  that  a 
substantial  fraction  of technical  progress  is embodied  in new capital.  For 
example,  suppose  that 1 percentage  point (or nearly all) the growth  in 
total-f  actor productivity  over the past thirty  years is attributable  to im- 
provements  in capital  efficiency.  This  would  mean  that  each  year  the same 
number  of (deflated)  dollars'  worth  of new capital  stock,  when  combined 
with a given  amount  of labor,  would  produce  1 percent  more  output  than 
a process  using  capital  that  is one year old. If this were  the case, changes 
in the average  age of the capital  stock  would  have an effect  on the growth 
of labor productivity.  Because  the "newness"  of capital  may be inferred 
from the ratio of net to gross capital stocks, the effect of 1 percent (a 
year) embodiment  may  be calculated.  Such  an estimate  is incorporated  in 
table 3. Even this extreme  assumption  can explain  only a reduction  of 0.1 
percentage  point in growth  of labor  productivity  in the 1965-73 period, 
and an additional  decline  of 0.1 percentage  point in the 1973-78 period. 
5.  This amounts to a simplified  version of the Divisia aggregation discussed by 
Norsworthy, Harper, and Kunze in this issue. The  weights used were 0.167 for 
equipment, 0.125 for structures,  and 0.100 for inventories, corresponding  to a real 
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Table  3. Rates  of Growth  of Labor  Productivity  and  of Contribution  from Capital 
Formation,  Nonfarnm  Nonresidential  Business  Sector, Selected  Periods,  1948-78 
Annual  average,  in percent 
Item  1948-65  1965-73  1973-78 
Gross  output  per hour  worked  2.75  2.09  0.92 
Contribution  to growth 
Using net capital 
Net capital  stock per hour worked  0.94  1.02  0.44 
Other  factors  1.81  1.07  0.48 
Using gross capital  and vintage  effects 
Gross capital  services  per full-time 
equivalent  employee  0.87  0.67  0.52 
Capital  vintage  effect at a 1 percent 
embodiment  ratea  0.14  0.05  -0.05 
Other  factors  1.74  1.37  0.45 
Source: Computed from the data in table 1, assuming a  Cobb-Douglas  production function with a 
coefficient of  one-third on  the capital input. Figures are rounded. 
a.  For the procedure  used to calculate this effect, see the discussion in the text. 
The Productivity  Mystery 
Many  of  the  measurement  issues  examined  above  do  not  have  much 
empirical  relevance.  Output  grows  at  about  the  same  rate  whether  it  is 
measured  in gross  or net terms;  potential  aggregation  problems  associated 
with  the  shift  from  structures  to  equipment  in  the  capital  stock  seem  to 
be minor;  and shifts  in the  average  "newness"  of  capital  could  have  con- 
tributed  only  a small  amount  to  the  observed  slowdown  in the  growth  of 
labor productivity.  In two  respects,  however,  data considerations  do seem 
to make  a difference.  First,  traditional  estimates  of the  capital  intensity  of 
production  (capital  per  hour  worked)  may  be  confounded  by  the  sub- 
stantial  decline  in  full-time  weekly  hours  between  1965  and  1973.  It  is 
possible  that the capital  intensity  of production  fell  slightly  in response  to 
the tremendous  acceleration  of employment  during that period,  rather than 
rising,  as the standard  estimate  indicates.  Second,  it is likely  that net mea- 
sures of the capital  stock  overstate  physical  depreciation  since  1973,  and 
therefore  also  overstate  the  deceleration  in  capital  input  since  that  date. 
The  effect  of  these  considerations  can  be  seen  in  table  3.  The  second 
and third rows  ("using  net  capital")  show  a Norsworthy  type  of  calcula- 
tion that uses  net  capital  stock  per hour  worked  as the measure  of capital Peter  K. Clark  431 
intensity  of production.  The capital-labor  ratio is estimated  to have in- 
creased  the growth  of labor  productivity  in the 1965-73 period,  and  then 
to have reduced  it by 0.6 percentage  point a year  in the 1973-78 period. 
The unexplained  part  of productivity  growth ("other  factors") still falls 
almost as much in the 1973-78 period as it did in the 1965-73 period, 
partly  because  adjustments  for pollution  abatement  capital  and quality  of 
the labor force were not included,  and also because elimination  of resi- 
dential  output  makes  the decline of productivity  in the 1973-78 period 
larger  than it is in estimates  by Norsworthy,  Harper,  and Kunze.  In the 
last three rows of table 3  ("using gross capital and vintage effects") 
some of the slowdown  in labor  productivity  in each of the two later  peri- 
ods is attributed  to successive  reductions  in the growth  of capital  intensity. 
In this  case,  the unexplained  reduction  in the growth  of labor  productivity 
is larger  in the 1973-78 period  than  in the 1965-73 period.  Either  type of 
calculation  shown  in the table  indicates  that "the  case of the missing  pro- 
ductivity"  is a two-part  mystery  extending  through  both the 1965-73 and 
1973-78 periods. 